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BOOK REVIEWS
SOVIET
mniTARY LAW AND ADINISTRATION AND DOCUmENTS 0N SovIET M=LITARY
LAw AND AD mSTRATION. By Harold J. Berman and Miroslav Kerner. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press. Pp. xiv, 208. Pp. xi, 164.

Although Soviet Russia has often been described as a "military dictatorship," and
even though it is a matter of common knowledge that no police state, whether communist or fascist, has long endured without a well-organized military power structure,
it is strange that books on Soviet military law and its administration have not thus far
appeared by the score. Such a lack is particularly bizarre when one realizes that it is
such power that gives the "cold war" significance of untold proportions. World peace
and tranquility unquestionably have been seriously disturbed because of the freeworld's fear of the presumed Soviet military power.
Nevertheless, the existing treatises on the subject either do not treat recent developments in Soviet military law and administration1 or are primarily concerned with the
nature and extent of Communist Party police controls, which are but one aspect of the
Soviet military structure and its administration.2 The need for a book to throw some
light upon this phase of Soviet activity was perceived by the authors who indicate at
the outset that although the Soviet military establishment is of "crucial importance
in the Soviet social, economic and political order, relatively little scholarly effort has
been devoted to the study of its internal structure." 3
The general public is already indebted to the Russian Research Center of Harvard
University for some enlightenment as to Soviet politics, policy and psychology. The
latest contribution of this Center, which has endeavored to carry out interdisciplinary
studies of Russian institutions and behavior, is "Soviet Military Law and Administration" by Professor Harold J. Berman 4 of the Harvard Law School and Air. Miroslav
Kerner, who served as a colonel with the Czechoslovak Army Unit on the Eastern
Front (the Red Army) from January 1, 1944 until the end of World War II in Europe.
The work, consisting of a text and a companion volume of documents, is designed to
fill the need for a general orientation concerning the organization and structure of the
Soviet Armed Forces and the Soviet system of military law and its administration as a
means of punishing crimes and maintaining efficiency, discipline and morale.
In a treatise of 166 pages the authors have made readily available to the Englishspeaking world a broad canvas which depicts, albeit in broad strokes, the entire system
of Soviet military law and its administration. This is accomplished by a systematic
treatment of Soviet military administration, Soviet military discipline, Soviet military
crimes and punishments, Soviet military courts and procedure, and an appraLal of the
Soviet military legal system and its administration. This treatise appeared with a companion volume of 164 pages of Russian laws governing the Soviet armed forces. The
authors indicate in their preface to the Documents on Soviet Military Law and Administration that the collection of laws is "comprehensive," not because it includes all
of the laws governing the Soviet armed forces, but rather, "in the sense that it covers
not only the structure of Soviet military administration but also the regulation of
military discipline, the system of military crimes and punishments and the procedure
1. White, The Growth of the Red Army (1944).
2. Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1953); Brzezinski, Political Controls in the Soviet Army
(1954). See also Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (1953).
3. Preface, Soviet flitary Law and Administration vii.
4. Professor Berman's prior work on Soviet law in general entitled "Justice in Russia: An

Interpretation of Soviet Law" has been widely reviewed.
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of military courts." In addition to laws, the Documents consist of official reports of
eight cases tried in Soviet military courts, one unofficial report, and several instructions
of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. relating to military crimes. These Documents
are conveniently arranged to follow the plan of the companion treatise, Soviet Military
Law and Administration.
It is apparent that persons of different professional backgrounds and disciplines will
read this important treatise carefully and with great interest. Although the greatest
benefit from a study of the book will be derived by those charged with the administration of military justice, it can be read with great profit by military commanders and
persons interested in law, government and political science. It ought to be read by all
students and teachers of criminal and comparative law.
All readers of this book will undoubtedly be interested in the information concerning
who rules the Soviet armed forces, the place of the Communist Party in the Soviet
military administration, the place of security police and M.V.D. troops in Soviet military administration and the structure of the Ministry of Defense and the High Command. Many will study the organizational charts which indicate the constitutional
links of the Soviet military system, its relation to the Communist Party, the Soviet
High Command and the "procuracy" of the Soviet armed forces. 0
Military commanders will read with especial interest the materials on Soviet military
discipline which demonstrate in a startling way how the attitude concerning the distinction of rank changed from the general spirit of comradery, which was supposed to
have existed after the abdication of the Czar in March 1917, to the present system
which demands instinctive and unconditional obedience to orders and strict discipline.
Although the Disciplinary Code of 1919 placed heavy stress on a spirit of equality, all
subsequent Codes have increasingly stressed differentiation as to rank and insistence
upon its respect.
A study of the military law of Soviet Russia differs from the study of the system of
military justice of many other countries because the Soviet military law is a part of
the general criminal law of Soviet Russia. This fusion or integration of the military
and the general criminal law makes the Soviet system unique when compared with the
system of military justice in the rest of Europe and America. Since the study is
therefore a study of the criminal law of Soviet Russia, the book acquires added meaning for the reader interested in the administration of the criminal law. Although the
authors confess that a thorough analysis is not offered in this area, it can be stated that
many valuable points are made. Surely matters relating to the objective or subjective
standards of guilt, disclosure of intent to commit crime and the like, are matters with
which students of criminal law are vitally concerned.7 Another point of interest deals
with the large class of civilians that under the Soviet system may be tried by military
courts. For example, military courts have jurisdiction over all "political" crimes,
whether committed by military personnel or civilians, civil defense personnel, civilians
participating in military crimes, evasion of call-up during mobilization or breach of
military registration in time of war, and a host of other offenses and situations.
Although the book introduces the reader to many doctrines or principles of Soviet
law, only two will be mentioned. The first deals with what the authors term the
"notorious" doctrine of analogy pursuant to which a person may be punished for a
socially dangerous act not directly prohibited by law, but which is analogous to a
prohibited act. 8 It is stated that this doctrine was designed to give the "greatest pos-

5. Preface, Documents on Soviet Military Law and Administration v.
6.

Charts I-IV at pp. 30-33.

7. Soviet Military Law and Administration 66-71.
8. Id. at 69.
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sible leeway to prosecutors and judges to apply the spirit of the Code as distinguished
from its letter." 9 Under this "doctrine" the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court ruled in 1945
that soldiers performing functions usually assigned to officers may be punished for
abuse of authority, excess of authority, neglect of authority or negligent attitude
toward duties under a particular section of the law, even though that section expressly
applies only to officers.' 0 In the discussion the authors state that this doctrine of
analogy was "hailed by Soviet jurists as the opposite of the 'bourgeois' doctrine of
'no crime, no punishment without a law.'" 11
Another principle of Soviet criminal law which also would warrant more discussion
and evaluation than can be afforded in a short treatise is the "principle" of law which
completely disregards intent in the punishment of dose relatives of an offender even
though they were guilty of no complicity. Hence, Soviet law provides that close relatives of one who flees across the frontier are subject to absolute criminal liability.
Innocent persons are thus guilty and punished notwithstanding the fact that they had
no connection whatever with the flight. The authors offer this possible explanation:
"The extremes of ruthlessness and leniency characteristic of Soviet military criminal
law are to be explained not as manifestations of humanitarian or inhumanitarian motives, but as manifestations of an explicit and conscious effort to use the law to accomplish specific social polides." 12
The book opens with certain "hypotheses" to guide the reader and concludes with an
appraisal of the Soviet system. The forthright admission and caveat contained in the
opening section of the "appraisal" chapter must be constantly borne in mind by the
reader. The authors have admitted their complete awareness of the fact that any
appraisal of the Soviet system of military law must suffer from the "relative lack of
available information" of what is actually done under color of law. To a certain extent
the book contains statements of imigr~s concerning the actual operation of the Soviet
system.' 3 Since it is apparent that the authors' evidence of this kind is fragmentary,
they confess their discouragement in having to report that "this is what the Soviets
say they do," without being able to follow up by showing what they actually do! The
authors point out, however, that what the Soviets say "is often quite revealing of what
they think and what they want."1 4 As a good example the authors offer the four
Disciplinary Codes of 1918, 1926, 1940 and 1946, each reflecting a different philosophy
of military life. Since the authors believe that much of the Soviet military law on the
books "effectively symbolizes what is actually done in practice," they believe that
the "only question is, how much' 5 The essential limitation, however, cannot be overemphasized. It is only when one knows what is actually done under the written law
that a true evaluation and comparison can be made.
Since these inherent limitations and weaknesses of a work such as "Soviet Military
Law and Administration" are also apparent to its authors, it cannot be said that any
false value has been placed upon the undertaking. Belief is not stated as dogma, and
conclusions and generalizations that cannot be proved are stated with diffidence and
reservation. 16 When thus presented no reader can claim to have been misled. The
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Ibid.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 151.
For example, see statement of 6migr6 concerning pretrial procedure, id. at 117.
Id. at 128.
Ibid.
For example, see conclusions regarding the people governed by Soviet law, id. at 165.
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book, therefore, stands as a splendid contribution to the increasing literature on Soviet
society in general and Soviet military law in particular.
EDWARD D. REt

THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY. By John H. Hallowell.
University of Chicago Press, 1954. Pp. 132

Chicago: The

In my opinion, this is one of the best short treatments (132 pages) of this subject
available in English. It fittingly continues the high standards set by others in the
series, also published by the University of Chicago Press: Philosophy of Democratic
Government by Ives Simon; The New Science of Politics by Eric Voegelin; Man and
the State by Jacques Maritain; Natural Right and History by Leo Strauss.
Hallowell writes with the assurance of one who is master of his subject; and almost
invariably he has a very quotable style. His book includes a nice balance of reference
to, and quotes from, other works for and against his thesis.
He does a politely devastating job on those he singles out for attack. For instance,
he does not approve of Thurman Arnold's insistence that only the character of the men
who control our organizations should concern us; and not programs and principles:
".. . how are we to know whether they are good men if we cannot examine and rationally evaluate the principles that motivate them and the programs which they advocate?
Arnold provides us with no standard of good character-indeed, denies that goodness
has any objective meaning, yet insists that it is good men, and good men alone, who
are going to solve our problems." (p. 14)
The author was even more effective in demolishing that strange melange of political
theories advocated by T. V. Smith, who regards democracy simply as "the art of compromise": "A minority will agree to temporary rule by the majority, not simply because the minority cherishes the hope of someday becoming the majority, but because
certain common interests transcend partisan interests. The breakdown of democracy
comes when this community of values and interests disintegrates,when common agreement on fundamental principles and purposes no longer exists, when partisans no
longer endeavor to work through the state but to become the state. Thus when Smith
declares that 'democracy does not require, or permit, agreement on fundamentals,' he
is proclaiming, in effect, the demise of democracy." (p. 36)
Democracy in Smith's sense tolerates anything, even contradiction and sedition; it
refuses to be bound by constitutions; and, if it is true to its bizarre principles, it would
give equal standing to the Communist conspiracy (under the guise of a "political
party") and the Democratic or Republican Parties.
Compromise, like everything else, can be carried too far. There are some compromises which any right consciences would rule out. Smith has not evaded the difficult
problem of ancient and modern ethics by defining democracy as the "art of compromise." He must still distinguish between the good and the bad-the good compromise and the bad compromise. Yet he cannot do so because in the last analysis he
subscribes to no inviolable or absolute truths or principles. He has no ultimate ends.
"Democracy is whatever can be
He has only methods. He settles nothing by writing:
'
arrived at democratically, and not another thing."
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1.

Smith, The Democratic Tradition in America 15 (1941).

BOOK REVIEWS
Commenting on this excerpt from Smith's work, Hallowell writes:
"Any procedural restraint, divorced from all other considerations, cannot logically,
however, impose substantive restraints and is no guaranty even of the continuation of
the procedure itself. Suppose that a democratic legislature decided by democratic
procedure to do away with civil liberties, suppose that it went further and decided by
democratic procedure to do away with itself as a deliberative body-we would have no
choice, if we accepted Smith's definition of democracy, but to accept this action as
democratic. And this is something more than a moot point, for something very much
like this has already happened in countries that were once democratic." (p. 46)
It has long been quite the style in certain judicial and law school circles to pooh-pooh
the Natural Law. Mfore often than not, this is the result of failing to understand it.
Oliver Wendell Holmes in his famous essay on the subject demonstrated hostility not
to the Natural Law as such but to a strange caricature which he imagined to be the
genuine philosophy of the Natural Law. Hallowell is not thus handicapped. He
believes that sound constitutional government is, in effect, a practical manifestation of
Natural Law philosophy-a determination of the means for those Natural Law ends
which serve as the cardinal principles of decency and morality.
We get out of our government institutions what we put into them. Let them be
pregnant with a sound philosophy, and in the long run, our mistakes, our gaucheries,
and even our sins of omission or commission will not be irretrievable disasters. There
is always some hope for the civlization that has the right vision. For all its tactics of
zigzagging, it will recognize the need of a master strategy to accomplish that vision.
It is only when a people becomes querulous about its vision; when they have no
genuine ideals; when they dream up the mental bilge that one ideal is as good as
another, or that no man can ever be sure of his ideals; that civilization (and with it
jurisprudence) is in trouble.
As Hallowell puts it: "Our democratic institutions require a philosophy of life to
The
sustain them. There are means to freedom, but they are not identical with it ....
means for victory over tyranny are abundant; only the ends are obscure." (p. 67)
They are obscure, not in themselves, but because a moral and intellectual skepticism,
dressed in the new garb of "non-commitalism" has descended like a smog on too many
of our intellectuals. In effect they say: "You must never be downright in your condemnation of any philosophy, any view, anything-because you may be wrong and
they may be right. No one can ever be sure he is right. There is no rule of reason;
and due process of law is nothing but a positivist formula which means that you
comply with the laws as they are written; but you can never fruitfully bring civil laws
to the bar of reason." Such an outlook is poles removed from that of the author of
this book: "God's image in man is reflected in the capacity of human beings to reason,
and the disparagement of that capacity can lead only to the denial of man's uniqueness.
And if men persist long enough in proclaiming that they are not essentially different
from animals, they cannot very well complain when they are treated like animals."
(p. 81)
I have given enough samples to serve as persuasive invitations to read this book. For
myself, I found it more provocative than dozens of speeches, articles and books in the
so-called liberal tradition, where you would expect, but where, generally, you do not
find, competent treatment of such subjects as freedom and democracy.

GonrvY P. SCHMUD4
t Assistant Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
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By
Alpheos Thomas Mason and William M. Beavey. New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1954.
This book is one of the best, if at times and to some extent, one of the most biased
textbooks available for the study of Constitutional Law that has come to the attention
of the writer. It was apparently designed and is excellently suited for a single semester
course. Many other casebooks do a more thorough job in the sense that they reproduce
more cases and carry more detailed references. By the same token, these other, larger
volumes are more unwieldy and sometimes by their very massed learning and research
actually get in the way of the students learning. Without counting the reprint of the
Constitution in this book's appendix, the volume under review comprises only 642
pages.
The selection of cases was, on the whole, made with rare judgment and discrimination. From the point of view of reader interest, it is, I think, a better selection than
can be found in most casebooks, large or small. What makes it possible for the authors
to present a relatively large dose of Constitutional Law in shorter scope than in most
other casebooks is a judicious interpolation of generally fine essays and appraisals
between systems of significant cases whose relationships and progressive settings are
engrossingly detailed.
The first essay entitled "The Constitution, the Supreme Court and Judicial Review"
is a worthy dissertation, in compendious form, on the basic ideas of our Constitution,
on the doctrine of judicial review, and on the jurisdiction and organization of the
federal courts. A brief but enlightening treatment of the organization and procedure
of the Supreme Court concludes this introductory essay.
Another good feature of the book is that almost every case is introduced by a generally accurate and succinct statement of its facts and background. One of the special
virtues of this collection of material is that the sequence of the cases selected, and the
introductory essays make the student realize and recognize the unity of development
and the close relationship between the various principles of Constitutional Law developed by the case presentation in each chapter.
The second introductory essay precedes cases devoted to Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the President. Here, in a brief but competent manner, the authors explain
the Constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and the limits of lawful delegation
of legislative authority to the executive; as well as the powers of the President.
The third group of cases is introduced by a discussion of federalism and of the
nature of national authority. In each case, the authors know where they are going and
reach their goal with a surprising and attractive consistency and unity of explication.
The next group of cases follows a treatment of the commerce power in relation to
state power. Here we find a development of Marshall's doctrine, Taney's doctrine, and
an analysis of the development of commerce power and state action in two periods;
namely, 1865-1890 and 1890-1953.
It was in Chapter V (the essay concerning Congressional power under the commerce
clause) that I found the bias to which I referred earlier. Certainly, I do not demand
of authors a complete and impossible impartiality which would really mean that they
never make up their minds one way or another on debated questions. To retail to the
student both sides of each important and relevant controversy but never to take sides
is not necessarily a desideratum. But the essay on Congressional power under the
commerce clause, under such subtitles as "The Need for National Action" and "Judicial
Choices in Constitutional Interpretation" and "The New Deal in Court," manifests
such a manifest and gross New Deal slant and prejudice as to suggest that those who
differ from the then pending New Deal legislation must either be classed as fools or
rogues. For example, in criticizing the majority decision in Panama Refining Co. v.
AmERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES.
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Ryan,' the authors say: "For the first time the principle, delegata Potestas non potest
delgari, a principle not found in the Constitution, formed the basis of a judicial decision overturning an Act of Congress." (p. 252). This, I submit, is an unfair and
prejudiced summary of the court's rationale and ruling. The majority used the Constitution as the basis for decision and not simply a literally translated Latin aphorism.
Nor is it true that the meaning of the Latin maxim is not found, at least by inference
or implication, in the Constitution. That it seems to me, is the broad meaning of the
doctrine of the separation of powers. Otherwise, it would be thoroughly constitutional
for one branch of government to hand over its powers to another.
On the same page, the authors unfairly, I think, criticize RailroadRetirement Board
v. Alton Ry. Co.2 Indeed, throughout this essay when they approve of a majority or
minority opinion and disapprove of the contrary opinion, they oversimplify by making
one side seem white and the other black. Almost uniformly it is the New Deal legislation, and the New Deal interpretation to defend such legislation, which is white and the
other view is black. At times they almost give the impression that in their opinion a
great need or emergency constitutes authorization to neglect the language or fair
intentment of the Constitution. Thus, they scoff at the "sanctity of a preconceived
theory of our Constitutional system." (p. 256). Is not the Constitution itself a preconceived theory-in the sense of a plan which necessarily antedated operation under
it? Where they get the notion that the American people in 1932, 1934, and 1936
"overwhelmingly approved" what they call the "entire legislative program" of the
incumbent administration, they do not specify. I don't think that the American people
(or indeed any people) understood the entire legislative program of that particular
year sufficiently to approve or disapprove it intelligently. Nor do I think it fair to
suggest, as they and Afr. Justice Brandeis suggested, that the court was exercisng "the
powers of a superlegislature in striking down certain New Deal legislation." (p. 257)
The case for such legislation cannot be so easily rationalized. It would have been
fairer, I think, to leave the impression that there was an honest difference of opinion
as to the interpretation of the Constitution. I know of no evidence that supports the
theory that because someone on the Supreme Court differed from Air. Justice Brandeis,
the result was a dear usurpation of the powers of a "superlegislature."
Nor do I think the basic issue was ever as simple as the authors put it on page 257.
"The Constitution is a straitjacket or vehicle of the nation's life." Every constitution
must in some sense serve as a "straitjacket." The same is true of every law. And in
an equally valid sense, every constitution and law, no matter what its degree of perfection or excellence, must serve as a vehicle of the nation's life. It adds nothing to
our knowledge to propose such an oversimplified and jejune disjunctive. "Popular
pressure, rising to the point of exasperation" may as a matter of history have an effect
upon the Supreme Court's rulings. But as a matter of theory and fidelity to the oath
of judicial office, it should not be decisive. Constitutional interpretation is not a matter
for popular determination. The vote of the electorate is not a kind of super-Supreme
Court, regulating the decisions of the Justices of that court.
Such unrelieved statements as the following add very little to opportunities for
learning Constitutional Law: "Though many congressmen urged that something be done,
they were uncertain what to do, not quite sure whether the trouble was the fault of
the Constitution or of judges 'callously insensible to the needs and demands of our
people."' (p. 258) I should think that the needs and demands of our Constitution,
until it is changed in the orderly fashion therein prescribed, would have a prior claim
upon Justices of the Supreme Court than the fluctuating "needs and demands of our
1. 293 US. 388 (1935).
2. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
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people" who, generally speaking, give too little study to these problems and are too
prone to sway with the winds of propaganda and emotion.
Likewise, I fail to see anything except an intransigent political partisanship in ideas
like the following, lodged in a treatment of the "Court Packing Threat": "Roosevelt,
quick to sense that his initial approach had been a major blunder, moved closer to the
real issue on March 4, when he likened the judiciary to an unruly horde on the government plow, unwilling to pull with its teammates, the executive and Congress.
As he saw it now, the crucial question was not whether the Court had kept up with its
calendar, but whether it had kept up with the country." (p. 259)
The Supreme Court does all that it needs to do when it fairly and reasonably keeps
up with the Constitution. If the Constitution does not keep up with the country, it
is time to change it by the orderly procedures of amendment. But the Supreme Court's
members should not bypass the amendment procedure merely in an effort "to keep up
with the country."
It is a little amusing to find that the authors propound this question with respect to
the awaited decision of the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
4
and Loughlin Steel Corp.8 "Would the Justices turn their backs on the Schechter and
Guffy Coal5 rulings and permit the national government to substitute law for naked
force in labor relations?" (p. 262) There was more naked force in labor relations
after the Wagner act than before. The federal and state Anti-Injunction acts had
literally paved the way for the use of naked force, by banning, for all practical purposes, injunctions in labor disputes. In many respects the whole area of labor relations
was thus abandoned to economic power. The courts were told, in effect, that they
could not consider the merits of the "labor dispute." A ruling pursuant to those merits,
once they found that a "labor dispute" was involved, was forbidden. So a technique
of nominalism opened the way for the virtual substitution of naked force, in labor
relations, for law and order. In any case, the question quoted from page 262, raises
no constitutional issue.
I need not labor the point. I think one of the chapters in the book is needlessly and
marringly prejudiced. But do not let my treatment of this part of the book prejudice
you. On the whole I like it immensely and I recommend it highly for the reasons
already stated.
GODFREY P. SCIIMIDTNINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790

TO 1955. By

Fred Rodell. New York: Random House, 1955. Pp. 338.
For members of the legal profession and laymen alike, Professor Rodell's book, Nine
Men, will make instructive and profitable reading. This work undertakes in the space
of 338 pages to tell the story of the Supreme Court from the beginning until the
present day. The author, Professor of Law at Yale University, and prolific contributor
to general magazines, ranging, as the dust jacket tells us, from Life and Look to
Harper'sand The New Republic, has very understandably been forced by the limits he
set himself, to discard much of the customary apparatus of scholarship so that documentation is entirely lacking for many of his statements. In reading the work one
should not be misled by the absence of references and the trappings of the heavily
researched book. Students of constitutional law and members of the legal profession
3. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
4. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
5. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
t Assistant Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
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will recognize the general pattern of the work and enjoy particularly the many interesting pieces of incidental information on the inner workings of the Supreme Court and
the background and personalities of the Justices who have "graced" the Court since it
first met in the basement of the Capitol in Washington.
The author's skill is demonstrated in his easy handling of many of the familiar cases
which have been regarded as constitutional landmarks along with the forces that shaped
particular decisions. He is at great pains to divest the Supreme Court of many of the
legends that have grown up around it and to manifest the Justices, great, near-great,
mediocre and downright poor, not as remote lawgivers towering above the political
battle, but as men whose motives and decisions are often enough the direct result of
their own political beliefs and personal backgrounds. This purpose leads Mr. Rode!
to paint his picture in bold strokes of black and white ignoring the subtle gray areas.
The reader, however, should not conclude that this is evidence of lack of insight. It
is a vexing problem of methodology quite understandable when one remembers his
purpose. Thus there appears in the book a series of "good" Justices and of "poor"
Justices, of heroes and villians, so to speak Nowhere is this more evident than in the
case of Mr. Justice Holmes, for whom Professor Rode! has almost unlimited veneration and unrestrained admiration. In this book Holmes is always wise, always abreast
of the times if not ahead of them, always right, although in fairness it should be noted
that Mr. Rode! does gently question one or two minor points where he feels that Mr.
Holmes showed himself less than usually "liberal."
Particularly welcome at the present time is the author's treatment of John Marshall
and his Court. The treatment is sympathetic but more critical than that given to
Holmes. Likewise, Roger Brooke Taney comes in for a few kind words and we are
reminded that but for the infamous Dred Scott decision Taney might well have a better
reputation in the history of the Supreme Court than has been his lot. Lesser figures
are discussed throughout the book and it is here that the reader will reap an abundant
harvest of factual information and benefit from Professor Rodell's insights into the
lives and times of figures such as James Wilson, William Johnson, the first Harlan,
Stone, Hughes, Brandeis, Cardozo, Vinson and a host of others. The New Deal Court
is discussed at length and in non-technical fashion and it seems that Mr. Rode! has
taken a temperate and fairly balanced position, considering his undisguised sympathy
for much of the New Deal program. The Fair Deal or Truman Court is likewise
subjected to a keen scrutiny and a fair, if sometimes unkind analysis.
The author raises the question towards the close of the book of cases affecting the
civil rights of Communists in the context of 1955. He is disturbed by restraints placed
on freedom of speech and other guarantees in the Bill of Rights in the cases of individuals suspected of disloyalty. That this is a serious problem for the United States
in mid-twentieth century, no one will deny. Mr. Rode! suggests no answer, wisely,
and contents himself with the liberal's expression of concern at a situation which he
feels is a threat to individual liberties. The thread of liberalism runs throughout the
book. One could wish for a sharper definition of the issues as between Mr. Rode! and
his non-liberal adversaries but perhaps that would be asking too much.
Here is a book to read. That Mr. Rode]! has chosen to write in a popular fashion
and to forego the comforting reassurance of the well-placed footnote without allowing
himself to become unscholarly at the same time, promises the student of the Supreme
Court a pleasant and rewarding excursion into the mysteries of that quasi-sacred,
uniquely American institution, the Supreme Court of the United States.

RoBEnr J. NELSON. S. J.f
-Professor of History, Bellarmine College, Plattsburg, N. Y.

